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1. INTRODUCTION
A woman washes a kitchen floor. She puts the mop away and drives to the
comer market. She consults a shopping list, and purchases groceries from it,
carefully choosing the least expensive options. A four-year-old child is tugging at
her leg while she does this, and she tries to entertain him, talking to him about
the mopped floor, the grocery items. When she returns from the store, she
t Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law. I wish to thank Hugh Baxter, Daniela Caruso,
Lawrence Lessig, Theodore Sims, Nancy Staudt and Jane Thrailkill for speedy and helpful comments on an
earlier draft. I thank Jennifer Carter and Richard Palermo for research assistance.
Copyright * 1997 Katharine B. Silbaugh. Permission to reproduce at cost for classroom use is hereby granted, so
long as copyright ownership and initial publication in the Yale Journal of Law and Feminism are identified
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prepares lunch from what she has brought home with her. She and the child both
eat lunch. After lunch, she and the child collect laundry and she runs a load. She
takes the garbage out to the curb. Then she reads him a story. They play a game
where she comes up with a word, and he tries to name its opposite. Sometimes
there is no opposite, and that is particularly funny to both of them. She has done
housework.
There is no way to tell from this description whether these activities were
market or non-market, whether her work is a commodity or not. Would it help to
categorize her work if you knew the location? Is this her home? Suppose that she
is a paid domestic worker, and this housework is a commodity. She leaves her
employer's home. She goes home and does exactly the same thing there, but this
time she is preparing dinner. The second child is her own. Whether these
activities are viewed as a commodity is contextual, not activity-based.
Should we think and talk about unpaid domestic labor-housework-using
market, or economic, language? What follows is a defense of economic
discourse on the subject of law and housework. It is written in response to the
common criticism aimed at scholars who have examined domestic labor through
an economic lens. It is a response to what is commonly called a
"commodification critique,"' and particularly as that critique is formulated
within feminist discourse.
In Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law,2 I examined the
treatment of household labor in tax law, torts, family law, social security, welfare,
contracts and labor law. I argued that characterizations of domestic labor by legal
actors almost never include an emphasis on its economic productivity, instead
focusing on housework as an expression of the affectionate emotions associated
with the family setting where housework occurs. By setting up a dichotomy
between the language of economic productivity and the language of emotions, I
argued that legal actors have used the language of emotions to deny material
security to those who perform domestic labor. From this I concluded that a more
clearly articulated understanding of the economically productive aspects of home
1. See infra Part f.A. While I am not aware of anyone devoting an entire essay to this criticism, casual
references are not uncommon. See, e.g., Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different

Perspective, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1125 (1981). In arguing against computing the value of housework, Blumberg
writes:
Her services are thus reduced to their domestic component; she is valued at a maid's salary. Surely,
the last fity years have produced no more degrading or useless formulation of the role and value of a
homemaker. In addition, quantum meruit has a distressing tendency to commodify and hence to
degrade what is probably the most important and certainly the most intimate human relationship.
Id at 1165 (footnotes omitted). See also James Boyd White, Economics and Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54
TENN. L. REV. 161 (1986). White argues against the use of market rhetoric:
The segmentation of the exchange model tends to misvalue the work we do for ourselves, which is

most of the traditional work of women ....This is especially true of people who raise their own
children. Such work cannot be segmented into functions and then made the material of the market
process, actual or hypothetical .... Similarly, housework has a different meaning when one is
maintaining one's own home rather than acting as a servant for others.
Id. at 190.
2. Katharine Silbaugh. Turning LaborInto Love: Housework and the Law, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1 (1996).
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labor would, on balance, benefit those who perform the labor, who are still
primarily women.3 I did not, however, address commodification problems with
that conclusion. The most explicit writing on commodification in legal discourse
has addressed the commodification of other aspects of women's experience:
sexuality and reproduction. This critique has been raised in response to some
recent work on domestic labor, including my own.5
I want to reject current categorical thinking about women's home activity. I
argue that economic understandings are very useful, and that they do not and
need not supply a complete understanding of human- activities. I will make the
case that economic understandings are representations of a given activity, as are
sentimental or emotional understandings, and that they can and should co-exist.
Margaret Jane Radin, the foremost legal scholar who has addressed
commodification concerns, has also argued that multiple understandings can counderstandings to market
exist. 6 Her goal, however, is to bring non-market
7
activities, in search of a less commodified society.
This Article questions that goal. My central argument is that the entirely
emotional understanding of home labor is itself an impoverished one. If one
conceded that the use of economic rhetoric could habituate people to thinking
about a topic differently, as critics of economic language assert, that would not
necessarily make the case againstthe use of such rhetoric in all contexts. I make
the uncommon case here for the value of bringing market understandings to nonmarket activities where they can co-exist with non-economic conceptions. The
broader implication of the thesis is that we should not assume that analyses that
can remake relations are always doing a disservice, especially where those
relations are already fraught with problematic analyses. In certain contexts it may
be a very conservative claim that economic analysis is bad because it has the
power to change the way we view something.
My claim is that gender equality requires us to take the economics of home
labor seriously. This argument turns on a comparison between wage labor and
home labor, which are similar both in content and in many of the motivations
3. Turning Labor into Love also compared the singularity of viewpoint about domestic labor among
courts and legislators to the understandings of home labor in the fields of economics and sociology. In those
fields, the home was once understood as an unproductive site of either consumption or emotions. But in recent
years, a shift has occurred in each field toward understanding the home as a place of economically productive
activity. That shift in other disciplines has allowed for entirely new research questions to be raised and explored
in those fields, and I argued that law would benefit from the same shift in understanding. Id. at 15-21.
4. The discourse is by no means limited to women's experiences. Richard Titmuss, for example, studied
markets and altruism in blood donation. RICHARD TIMuss, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO
SOCIAL POLICY (1971). Margaret Jane Radin has criticized the commodification of housing and employment.
See Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 (1987). But the most sustained

critiques have been in areas touching on women's experience.
5. See Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, 84 GEO. L.J. 1571 (1996) (addressing commodification
concerns with her effort to quantify the value of home labor for taxation purposes); see also Blumberg, supra

note 1; White, supra note 1. I heard the commodification critique every time I delivered a talk based on the
draft of TurningLabor into Love and in correspondence since its publication.
6. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODrrmEs 104 (1996).
7. Id.
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that drive workers. I argue that the difference in the treatment between them may
be difference based on gender. I discuss the tendency to raise commodification
concerns when women's interests are at stake, and question whether resistance to
market reasoning in these contexts is a form of resistance to women's economic
power. I then examine some legal doctrines touching on home labor that could
benefit from economic analysis. If importing economic reasoning into these
areas transforms our understanding of them, I posit that women would benefit
from that transformation. I conclude that as long as so many of women's
activities remain non-market and as long as women's economic welfare is a
concern of feminists, economic analysis of non-market activities is affirmatively
desirable. My objective is to show what can be gained by allowing economics to
inform, without dominating, the discourse on policy and doctrine surrounding
home labor. Concern over women's lives becoming entirely commodified seems
by comparison an abstract worry.
HI. THE COMMODIFICATION OBJECTION: SETTING OUT THE CASE AGAINST
ECONOMICS
A The Basic Problem with Commodification
The standard argument against commodification, often referred to as the
"commodification critique," is that certain human attributes or certain resources
should lie wholly or partially beyond exchange, because to allow exchange
would be inconsistent with a vision of personhood or human flourishing.
Prohibiting exchange may not be enough; it may be necessary to discourage
economic analysis and discourse about these attributes. "[M]any kinds of
particulars--one's politics, work, religion, family, love, sexuality, fiiendships,
altruism, experiences, wisdom, moral commitments, character, and personal
attributes [are]... integral to the self. To understand any of these as monetizable
...is to do violence to our deepest understanding of what it is to be human."8
Elizabeth Anderson has reviewed commodification concerns and applied
them to women's reproductive labor in a piece interestingly titled, "Is Women's
Labor a Commodity?" 9 She defines a commodity as something to which "the
norms of the market are appropriate for regulating its production, exchange and
8. Radin, supra note 4 at 1905-06. The commodification literature is far too expansive to review in detail
here, particularly given my narrower concern with domestic labor. See, e.g., EL1-ABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN
ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993); MARTHA NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990); HILARY PUTNAM,
REASON, TRUTH AND HISTORY (1981); RADIN, supra note 6; MICHAEL WALTzER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A
DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983); JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow (1985); Elizabeth S.
Anderson, Is Women's Labor a Commodity? 19 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 71 (1990); Neil Duxbury, Do Markets
Degrade? 59 MOD. L. REv. 331 (1996); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Market Discourse and Moral Neutrality in
Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REv. 605 (1994); White, supra note 1.

9. See Anderson, supra note 8. I find the title interesting because she uses the seemingly broad term

"women's labor" although she purports to be discussing only surrogate motherhood. The broader title may
reflect just the gender perspective on all women's activities that I criticize in Section IlI.C.2. See also
ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 168-89.
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enjoyment."' l The application of market norms is inappropriate where they "fail
to value [the thing] in an appropriate way."" If it is appropriate to apply "use" as
the proper mode of valuation, then market norms are acceptable and we may
treat something as a commodity. 2 If instead, a mode of valuation such as
respect, "love, admiration, honor and appreciation,' 13 are more appropriate, then
we should not treat something as a commodity. To value something differently
than as a commodity is, according to Anderson, to recognize a "special intrinsic
worth" to that item.' 4 This essentialist notion that things have an intrinsic worth
turns out to be important to anti-commodification arguments. 15 Anderson argues,
"When women's labor is treated as a commodity, the women who perform it are
degraded.' 16 Degradation means that "something is treated in accordance with a
lower mode of valuation than is proper to it.' 17 Finally Anderson believes that
commodifying women's labor leads to exploitation of women. This is so because
women's noncommercial motivations are taken advantage of without offering
anything but commercial responses.'"
Anderson's work draws on a notion of incommensurability of value that is
seen in the work of Martha Nussbaum.19 As applied to the domestic labor
context, the problem of incommensurability would arise with the need to give the
labor a market value when it is not commensurable to market goods or services.
They may not be commensurable where, for example, one is measured on a
valuation scale that can translate into dollars, where another is measured on one
that cannot, such as love, admiration, wonder, or respect. While these scholars
have not applied their critiques directly to housework, it can be argued that there
is no perfectly accurate market replacement for unpaid work, for example childcare, that a family member performs.
The commodification critique applies to an analysis of the economy of the
home and the family labor that occurs there, as well as to the actual purchase and
sale of that labor. To Anderson, market norms have an "expressive significance"
as well as a practical one, and can thus infect non-market conceptions of
women's labor.20 The argument posits that talk matters: you can pervert the
personalness of something by talking about it as if it were fungible. Identifying
an "economy," meaning a set of implicit valuations and exchanges, is possible
even where "real markets" are either prohibited or practically impossible to
10. Anderson, supra note 8, at 72.
11.

Id.

12. See id.
13. Id.
14. See id. at n.2.

15. Later, when comparing home labor to wage labor, I will question whether it can be meaningfully said
that the difference between the two is in any sense intrinsic.
16. Anderson, supra note 8, at 75.
17. Id. at 77. By this she means that a use valuation is applied to it, when, for example, the mode of
valuation should be a higher form such as admiration, respect, or love.
18. See id.at81.
19. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 8, at 106-24.

20. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 77.
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imagine: organs for transplantation, sexual contacts, candidates for marriage
partnerships, religious convictions, love, or a person's politics. Although in many
cases this is just talk,' to a commodification skeptic, that talk itself does damage
to the integrity of the attribute in question: sexuality, love, marriage, health.22
James Boyd White has made this case most powerfully, arguing that
expression is never transparent, but instead constitutes and transforms the reality
it describes. Says White: "the languages we speak, and the cultural practices they
at once reflect and make possible, form our minds by habituating them to certain
modes of attention, certain ways of seeing and conceiving of oneself and of the
world., 23 White concludes that economic language should be "vigorously
resist[ed], 24 because "[t]he conventions of this discourse necessarily habituate
its user[s] to thinking in terms of self-interest as a central principle., 25 In
passing, he applies this critique to an economic understanding of home labor,
noting that:
The segmentation of the exchange model tends to misvalue the work we
do for ourselves, which is most of the traditional work of women ....
This is especially true of people who raise their own children. Such work
cannot be segmented into functions and then made the material of the
market process, actual or hypothetical, for what the child requires is the
sustained presence of, and interaction with, a loving and respectful
person, something no alternative can supply. Similarly, housework has a
different meaning when one is maintaining one's own home rather than
acting as a servant for others.26
To those who see a difference between real and rhetorical markets, the
difference tends to be treated as one of degree. Under this view, it might not hurt
personhood as much to talk about markets in certain attributes as it does to
create such markets, but talk certainly doesn't help. By condemning talk as well
as trades, skeptics take away the opportunity to make the affirmative case for the
benefits of an economic perspective. For legal analysts, this conflation of actual
buying and selling and market analysis proves problematic, as we will see later.
B. A Taxonomy ofAnticommodification Discourse
Margaret Radin sets out a number of useful categories of thought about
commodification. She uses the term "radical non-commodification" to refer to a
21. In some cases, it is not just talk. For example, prostitution, whether legally sanctioned or not, is
widespread, and there is an underground market in foreign brides.
22. This point is made by both Radin and Anderson. See Radin, supra note 4, at 86-88; Anderson, supra
note 8, at 77.
23. White, supra note 8, at 166.
24. Id. at 164.
25. Id at 173-74.
26. Id. at 190.
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utopian vision in which people and things are embodied with unique personality
and cannot be exchanged under any circumstances. 27 The ideal of universal noncommodification is associated with Marx, and arguably lurks in the background
of Radin's early work, which idealizes a future world without commodification
but acknowledges the distance between this world and that one. Radical
commodification describes an ideal where anything of value will be ownable and
freely exchangeable. 28 Radical commodification within the legal discourse is
associated with Gary Becker and Richard Posner.29 To them, it is often said,
every objection to markets other than on administrability grounds is misguided,
mushy sentimentality that hurts the people it is intended to help. Real welfare,
both individual and societal, will always be promoted by permitting exchange.
3
33
Nothing is off the table: babies,30 organs, 31 surrogacy, 32
sex, 33
justice,34 and so
on.
Finally, "partial commodification" describes Radin's understanding of our
current world. She uses employment law and housing market regulation as
examples, because both are traded in the market but that trade is subject to
extensive regulation.35 Radin points to ways in which the idea of partial
commodification can be used.36 First, we might have spheres of
commodification, where some areas of experience are inappropriate for
commodification altogether, but those things that can be commodified are
commodified completely. Radin calls this "liberal compartmentalization,"
identifies Michael Walzer as its most distinguished proponent, and disapproves
of it as both impossible and undesirable. 37 Liberal compartmentalization is most
clearly illustrated by the desire to establish the home and the political sphere as
spaces that are entirely non-market, with much of what is outside of the home
and the government as presumptively a market domain. This kind of partial
commodification is one way to remedy the uneasiness most people have with
27. See RADIN, supra note 6,at 79-83.
28. Posner takes the view that as long as it is administratively feasible to have a market, there should be
one for everything that people value that is also scarce. See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
32-35 (4th ed. 1992); see also Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation? 85 COLuM. L. REv. 970 (1985).

29. Gary S.Becker has earned this reputation through A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1981), his Nobel
Prize winning work. Posner has earned this reputation based largely on an article proposing a market in
adoption and his economic analysis of sex and sexual regulation, SEx AND REASON (1992). Whether these
reputations are an entirely accurate reflection of the work is not important to this argument: they both serve as
place-markers in the discourse on commodification within legal academics.
30. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL
STuD. 323 (1978).
31.

See Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasingthe Supply of Transplant Organs: The Jlrtuesof a FuturesMarket,

58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1(1989).
32. See Comments, Baby-Sitting Consideration:SurrogateMother tRight to "Rent Her Womb" for a
Fee, 18 GoNz. L. REV. 539 (1983).
33. See generally POSNER, supra note 29.
34. See Gary S.Becker & George J. Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasance, and Compensation of
Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974).
35. RADN, supra note 6, at 108-110.
36. Seeid.at46-53, 102-118.
37. See id. at 46-53.
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radical commodification. Radin dislikes it because it permits unfettered
commodification in those areas that do not receive complete market immunity. 38
I dislike it because it permits unfettered noncommodification of large segments
of women's labor, as I will argue later.
The other kind of partial commodification is called "incomplete
commodification" by Radin, and she believes that it provides a better descriptive
and normative view. 39 Incomplete commodification applies where the same
attribute or thing is thought of in both market and non-market terms. There are
no spheres where the market is completely banished or completely dominant.
Competing market and non-market conceptions of the same thing can be held in
two ways. The first is by different segments of society who contest either the
commodified or the non-commodified understanding held by others but where
neither segment can claim a consensus. The second is where a person or people
understand both the commodity aspects of a thing or attribute and its noncommodity aspects; here the two understandings are simultaneously at work
within the same person. Radin says that both of these types of co-existences have
led to public policy choices that embody or accommodate the plural meaning at
play. Radin argues that these multiple meanings can achieve stability, and when
they do we are better off than if we require one conception to extinguish others.
She is particularly concerned with making sure that market understandings do
not extinguish non-market ones.4 °
Radin identifies what she calls the "domino theory" in the discourse on
commodification. 4 1 This is the idea that is held by many that if any commodified
version of an attribute or thing exists, non-commodified versions will cease to
exist. Where incomplete commodification exists, the market understanding will
eventually prevail over the non-market understanding, and the non-market
understanding will be extinguished. While the inevitability of extinguishing nonmarket understandings is never well-explained, the argument is used to support
prohibitions on all commodification of an activity. For example, if it is important
to the culture that a non-commodified version of sexuality exists, and if any
commercialized sexuality will extinguish or infect the non-commodified version
by making all people understand their sexuality as having a price, all
commercialized sex must be prohibited to honor the greater societal value placed
on the continued existence of non-commodified sex. The domino theory posits
that both cannot exist without changing each other.
Another example of the domino theory argument is one against surrogate
mothering or markets in adoption. These arguments proceed as follows: it would
be awful for children to understand themselves as having a price. If any children
are traded through the process of surrogacy or markets in adoption, all children
38.
39.
40.
41.

See id at 46.
See id. at 102-118.
See id. at 107.
See id. at 95-101.
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will come to understand that they too are marketable. This understanding would
extinguish the non-market norm in familial relations.42 Since the latter norm is
extremely valuable to us, we should not allow any commodification of either
reproductive capacity or adoption, lest the non-commodified conception cease to
of cases where markets played no role in the
exist even in that majority
43
family.
a
of
formation
Radin identifies what she calls the problem of the double bind: one might
idealize non-commodification in a utopian world, but in this world
decommodifying only certain things may do more harm than good.44 For
example, total decommodification of sexuality may be an ultimate goal, but as
long as it is partially commodified, prohibiting prostitution may do more harm
than good by hurting a particularly vulnerable class of people: those engaged in
the commercial sex industry. She calls this a problem of transitional balancing,
where the transition is from our world to an ideal world. 4' The balancing trick is
to consider the damaging effects of non-commodification in the present world
and thus tend toward permitting commodification, while also considering the
domino effect whereby commodifying might change the nature of the thing for
the worse, so that we find ourselves moving farther from the ideal. How to
decide between these two pulls of the double bind? Says Radin, there is no
formula. We must engage in a context-specific, factual inquiry to tell us whether
commodification or decommodification will do more good than harm, all things
considered, for each given contested attribute or thing. Her formula gives us no
real criteria for making the decision, but it does invite us to go straight to the
facts and not to force the conversation onto a broader theoretical plane.
The idealized future world in Radin's view seems implicitly to be one
without commodification,4 6 but she has become increasingly open to the limited
use of markets and market language in contested cases. Although it contained
many qualifications and examples of partial commodification, her earlier work
on the subject, most notably Market-Inalienability,47 left the legal academy with
42. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 8, at 77-78 (taking this view of the expressive function of sales that
can spill over into non-market activities).
43. A final classic example of the domino theory is blood donation. See generally RICHARD M. TrMUSS,
THE GiFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971). Titmuss argues that people donate

blood because they understand themselves to be doing an act of generosity that is literally and figuratively
priceless. If blood were routinely bought and sold, as it has been at some times and in some places, the
priceless act would acquire a relatively low market value. Knowing that blood could simply be bought in a
shortage, people would no longer feel either the urgency to give or the satisfaction at having done something
heroic. Donors, it is argued, are less likely to endanger the blood supply than those who sell blood, and thus a
market in blood would both harm the blood supply and take away the opportunity for altruism that blood
donation currently provides. Where both a market and a non-market version exist, the market version
extinguishes the viability of the non-market version. If the non-market version is more important, the argument
goes, the market version must not be permitted lest we lose the better version. Id.
44. See RADIN, supra note 6, at 123-130.
45. See Radin, supra note 4, at 1875.
46. I say implicitly because Radin is careful not to make this claim fully, although it is thoroughly
implicit in Market-Inalienability,supra note 4, and continues to be relevant in CONTESTED COMMODTIES,
supra note 6.
47. Radin, supra note 4.
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the overall impression that she was arguing that any commodification, rhetorical
or real, begins us on a long slippery slope to the undesired end of universal
commodification. Her most recent work, Contested Commodities, 48 leaves a
different impression. She argues that there are many ways in which partial
commodification can thrive and remain stable. Her taxonomy of
49
commodification there, where she discusses what she calls "plural meaning,"'
is
very useful in thinking about domestic labor, as we will see below. Because it is
such an integral part of the response to commodification critiques, I devote Part
I,Section A to a discussion of plural meaning.
Ultimately, however, Radin makes a one-way claim for the value of
importing non-market understandings into market activities. She believes that
improvement of personhood will come from a better grasp of those non-market
attributes. I thoroughly agree with Radin's conclusion that multiple conceptions
are possible and beneficial, but my emphasis for this paper is to turn her
conclusion around. I argue for a better recognition of and understanding of the
economic aspects of non-market activities. Under this view, plural meanings are
not a matter of transition; either market or non-market understandings are
functional representations, not ideal models.
C. Feminism and Economic Skepticism
Feminists rank high among those who are skeptical of economists. This
skepticism proceeds on two fronts in the domestic labor context. The two parts
are a negative reaction to economics as a way to describe home activities, and an
affirmatively positive response to love and affections as a descriptively accurate
way of understanding and explaining productivity in the home.
1. Offense at Economics
Some feminists have a visceral dislike for economic analysis. While there are
many reasons for this, I believe two are most strongly at play. The first is
situational: Many feminists don't trust the current practitioners of economic
analysis. The second is more substantive: Many feminists do not accept the
implicit notion of fungibility at play in economic analysis.
The problem of distrust may come from two characteristics of economic
discourse. The first is a driving, relentless essentialism among economists. Much
economic literature reads like much more than a useful tool with which to
explain certain phenomenon. It instead reads like the raison d'etre of that
phenomenon, its beginning and end. Everyone has her favorite example of a
social phenomenon being mercilessly pushed into an economic model producing

48. RADIN, supra note 6.

49. See id. at 102, 107.
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logically clean but absurd explanations: adoption,50 marriage,51 heroic rescues,' 2
voting, 53 altruism, 54 religion, 55 childbirth, 56 sexuality.57 This kind of relentless
essentialism among economists 58 leaves reasonable people with what appears to
be a decision to either embrace the whole absurd end of the spectrum or jump
ship entirely. I will argue that it is fully possible and desirable to use economics
to assist in understanding a social phenomenon without turning away from other
possible explanations or understandings. But this does not describe much of the
dominant economic analysis practiced in the legal academic community. The
idea of extending this sort of essentialism into the social relations surrounding
family labor seems to carry the risk of damaging the complex context of
dependencies and moral and emotional commitments made there.
The second reason many feminists distrust practitioners of economic analysis
is that they often employ assumptions with suspect origins. Moreover, although
these are almost always identified at the outset as assumptions, by the end of the
equation they seem to have assumed the status of fact. In legal discourse, when
an assumption is used in an economic model, we usually see the burden of proof
implicitly shifted to critics of the model to disprove the factual assumption
despite the frequent lack of evidence in favor of the assumption from the outset.
There is the well-known joke about the economists on a desert island with a case
of food in tin cans. They begin their plan for opening the cans by saying, "First,
let's assume a can opener." It's funny when it's a can opener. It is not so funny, or
at least it shouldn't be, when the empirically unsupported assumption is that
women want children more than men do, that women have higher inherent value
when they are young and men are worth more when they are older,59 that
husbands and wives in most cases have the perfect trust and agency necessary to
treat them as a single economic unit (individuals are selfish and self-interested
but family heads are altruistic), 60 or that rapists would pay for sex somehow if
they had the necessary wealth of money, power, or looks themselves. 6 1 Having

50. See Landes & Posner, supra note 30.
51. See BECKER, supra note 29.
52. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvars, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other
Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law andAltruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83 (1978).
53. See POSNER, supra note 28.
54. See BECKER, supranote 29, at 194-95.
55. Comment, Schylla, Charybdis,andAdam Smith: An EconomicAnalysis of the Religion Clauses, 39
DE PAULL. REV. 1235 (1990).
56. Stephen V. Marks, Teaching Guide: Abortion Economics, 26 EcoNOMIc INQUIRY 175 (1988).

57. See POSNER, supra note 29.
58. I think here particularly of Gary Becker because his work deals so directly with women's issues.
This by no means describes all economists. See, e.g., DONALD N. MCCLOsKEY, THE RHETORIC OF ECONOMICS
(1985). However, it describes enough of the literature to account for a general aversion to economic analysis on
this ground.
59. Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi-Rents, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 285-86 (1987)

(arguing that the ability to bear children raises women's value, as does youthful beauty).
60. See BECKER, supra note 29, at 172-201.
61. See POSNER, supra note 28, at 201 (using rape as an example of coerced wealth transfer).
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those assumptions implicitly raised to the level of facts over the course of an
economic analysis is particularly problematic.
I think of the implicit elevation of assumption to fact as "assumption
slippage." It must be noted that this slippage is a dynamic process: Readers of
economic texts, particularly in the legal community, are participants in its
occurrence as much if not sometimes more than economic authors. Much of the
most prominent economic analysis of family and gender relations, particularly
that associated with Gary Becker, relies on very questionable assumptions that
appear to come right out of the pages of The Total Woman 62 and from there they
help to build economic rationalizations for very conventional mid-twentieth
century middle class suburban gender relations.63 In the words of Barabara
Bergmann, "to say that New Home Economists [Becker et al.] are not feminists
in their orientation would be as much of an understatement as to say that Bengal
tigers are not vegetarians."" Isabel V Sawhill has offered a critique of the lack of
empirical basis for some of the basic assumptions of the New Home Economists
who are prominent in the field.65 As economists know from their training but
their legal readers quickly forget, an economic model is only as good as its
assumptions. Hence, the implicit standard in economic scholarship is that
unproved assumptions must be plausible before a model based on them is
acceptable, even with caveats. In the context of home labor, those assumptions
are very important. Assuming altruistic heads of households reduces the need to
worry about disparate human capital investments made within the family. The
assumption that women desire children more than men do provides an
explanation for what otherwise might be tricky distributional results that occur
within families. If these are to be the assumptions on which an economic
analysis of home labor is to proceed, many people do not want any part of it.
I cannot join the routine conclusion that the problems with Gary Becker's
work are so far-reaching as to make his work as a whole of limited use. We are
indebted to Becker for raising extraordinarily important economic questions
about the functioning of the family. Becker has brought us many ideas that are
extremely helpful in thinking about family relations, including the very notion
that in economic terms the home is a place of production and not just a place of
consumption. If he has proceeded from unsupportable or incomplete
assumptions, those can be corrected and the analysis and its outcomes adjusted
62. MIRABLE MORGAN, THE TOTAL WOMAN (1973). This text served as a guide to Good-Wife behavior
in an effort to protect conventional middle class marriage from the social unrest caused by second-wave

feminism.
63. Nobel-Prize-winning economist Gary Becker is the most prominent among these economists, but he
has many followers. An example is Becker's calculation that women have a comparative advantage in

childrearing that explains the division of labor whereby men engage in market activities and women engage in
non-market activities. See BECKER, supra note 29, at 21-32.
64. Barbara Bergmann, The Task of a Feminist Economics: A More Equitable Future, in THE IMPACT
OF FEMINIST RESEARCH iNTHE ACADEMY,132-33 (Christie Farnham ed., 1987).
65. Isabel V. Sawhill, Economic Perspectives on the Family, 106 DAEDALUS 115, 120-24 (1977).
Others have followed. See generally BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds.,
1993).
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accordingly. Indeed, examining and critiquing these assumptions has been a
large implicit part of the feminist response to law and economics already, and
should continue to be so. However, critiquing assumptions does not inflict a fatal
blow to methodology. It would be a mistake to hold these questionable
assumptions out as an indictment of an entire mode of analysis. This is a
standard to which most scholars would not wish to be held, and feminists are no
exception.
There is, however, an extremely important lesson about the scope of the
usefulness of economic analysis to be learned from assumption slippage and the
response to it: empiricism counts. Empirical research and data need to drive any
real search for policy solutions to basic problems, or even to clear
understandings of the problems themselves. Law professors are not in a great
position at this time to do empirical research and must rely on fields outside of
law or economics, such as sociology, to inform economic understandings. Doing
so is not without its own difficulties for lawyers untrained in understanding and
sorting sociological research. The most that economic understandings can do is
to highlight some empirical questions that need to be answered. Even answers to
empirical questions do not close debates over facts. If we are confident that a
resource is scarce as a matter of empirical fact, we can either treat that as a given
or instead ask why it is scarce. That which has an empirical basis is not thereby
natural or inevitable, and so even provable assumptions should be open for wellframed criticisms. But once again, economics can assist in the framing task
itself
I do not wish to be understood as overstating the ease of remembering that
we are dealing with hypothetical models when we use economic analysis. I think
the risk of forgetting is more serious when we cannot verify the empirical
assumption. We move quickly on from it, sensing that the unavailability of data
threatens to make an otherwise elegant model useless. Perversely, the less
supportable an assumption, the less contestable it is, and the more it acquires the
status of fact. It may be that James Boyd White's concern with the culture of
economic discourse is played out most seriously when data is least available.
The next level of concern over economic analysis does not center solely on
the supposed "priors" of its practitioners. It is a more substantive criticism: A
rejection of the suggestion that many attributes of family life and work are
fungible, and thus that the study of value can proceed by observing choices
people make. Fungibility is the idea that goods, services, or attributes can be
placed on a single metric of value and then traded off against one another on that
metric. Fungible things can be replaced by something else that falls in the same
place on the metric, such as similar services by a different person, or simply
money measured in the right amount, without regret. On this account, economics
is entirely concerned with theoretically measurable maximized choice among
alternatives, rather than being concerned with the personal experience of choice,
methods of provisioning in general (whether by voluntary exchange, gift-giving,
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or coercion),66 or with the process of developing what economists call
preferences. Radin concedes that whether we think the fact of choice between
alternatives proves fungibility, as many economists believe, or instead prove
nothing about fungibility, is largely a matter of intuition.67 Joseph Raz argues
that the meaning we give to a choice is its conventional understanding, and if
that does not include a trade along a single metric, then no such fungibility can
be inferred. 68 Raz taps into many people's response to the talk of fungibility
when thinking about marriage, romantic partners, and family work choices that
are implicit in an economic analysis of home labor.
There is a similar negative response to the notion of bargaining within
marriage or within family relations, which is an important element of an
economic understanding of home labor. Though a bargaining model is often
thought of as an improvement on Becker's notion of an altruistic head of
household which can justify a failure to examine interspousal conflict, the
bargaining model itself draws a negative response from many.69 While many
would acknowledge much day-to-day bargaining within the family, it is also
thought that a bargaining analysis fails to capture the altruistic behavior layered
alongside self-interested behavior in family relations. It is difficult to predict
much about behavior if one can rely neither on complete self-interest nor on
complete altruism, and a bargaining analysis of family labor puts forward
assumptions about family behavior to which many respond negatively.70
2. The Aptness of the Emotional Understanding

The former critique, that family labor is not fungible and not always
strategic, is also frequently stated in the affirmative: Family labor is uniquely
emotional. In Turning Labor into Love, I bring an operative mode of analysis to
the surface-home labor is viewed as an expression of familial emotions. In
discussing this argument with others, I would routinely hear that this is the mode
of analysis at play in law because it is an accurate characterization of family
behavior. What is wrong with the affections characterization? Family care is all
66. See Julie A. Nelson, The Study of Choice or the Study of Provisioning?:Gender and the Definition
of Economics, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN 23 (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993).
67. See RADIN, supranote 6, at 12.
68. See Joseph Raz, Value Incommensurability: Some Preliminaries, 86 PROCEEDINGS OF THE
ARISTOTELIAN SOCIETY 117, 128, 132-34 (1985-86).

69. See Marilyn Manser & Murray Brown, Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining
Analysis, 21 INT'L ECON. REv. 31 (1980).

70. A bargaining analysis assumes complete self-interest as between spouses, an assumption that is
probably no more plausible than one of complete altruism. See Paula England, The Separative Self:
Androcentric Bias in NeoclassicalAssumptions, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, 37, 48 (Marianne A. Ferber &

Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993). In RationalFools: A Critique of the BehavioralFoundation ofEconomic Theory,
6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317 (1977), Amartya K. Sen first made this point about the limitations of economic
thinking after one drops the implausible assumption of purely self-interested human behavior. Game theorists
have identified this general issue in recent years through discussions of co-operative or partially co-operative
models, which might usefully be applied to family decision-making. Nonetheless, economists have not
perfected a response to this important criticism.
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about affections. Should courts ignore the emotional motivations behind caring
for a child or preparing a meal for a partner or spouse? While I will argue below
that this idea can co-exist with an economic understanding of home labor, many
feel that an economic understanding demotes or denigrates the emotional
significance of home labor: this is the essence of the domino theory at play.
These criticisms of the commodification of home labor through the use of
economic rhetoric and analysis, in many general respects, represent a subset of
criticisms of all commodification and economic rhetoric. The family context,
however, raises the concerns discussed above in a particularly bright light.
I believe that feminist skepticism of economics is understandable but should
be avoided. I will argue below that keeping economic understandings away from
women's activities represents a particularly gendered understanding of those
activities that is itself costly.

Im.A REPLY
My response to the critiques set out so far is that the feminist legal discourse
should be open to economic understandings of home labor. The argument
proceeds on several fronts. First, a claim for economic understandings is not a
claim against other understandings. Here I build on Radin's idea that
phenomenon have plural meanings. 71 Next, within legal discourse, the

transformative effect of language may not operate with the all-consuming power
that some might expect from language in other areas of study. Furthermore, to
the extent that economic analysis has the transformative power that skeptics of
economics attribute to it, I question the general assumption that these
transformed norms are inherently negative if they highlight market
understandings. I do so by examining the case of home labor. I argue that home
labor and wage labor are in many ways similar. That similarity includes both the
content of the work and the mixed motivations behind the work. Both waged and

unwaged labor contain market and non-market aspects. I posit that differences
between their treatment ought to be understood as differences related to gender,
given the history and current practices surrounding home labor. I ask for
skepticism toward that different treatment, given its tendency to leave women
without cash in the name of non-commodification. I explore the tendency of the
non-commodification argument to be economically disempowering to women in
other areas in support of the claim that it has this effect on home labor. I then
return to the claim that transformation of current understandings is not always a
ground for criticizing language, and that in the home labor context, it may be a
ground for embracing economic language. I end with a set of policy debates that
I believe can be enhanced by viewing home labor as economic activity.

71. See RADIN, supra note 6, at 102-114.
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A. PluralMeaning
The most important response to the commodification critique, and one that
Radin herself embraces, is the notion of what she calls 72"plural meanings:"
multiple understandings of a single activity that can co-exist.
The way to a less commodified society is to see and foster the nonmarket aspect of much of what we buy and sell, to honor our internally
plural understandings, rather than to erect a wall to keep a certain few
things completely off the market and abandon everything else to market
rationality. 73
While Radin's insight into the possibility of plural meaning is useful, it is
impossible not to notice her hierarchy among models. She seeks a less
commodified society, not plural conceptions of human activity. Radin gives little
encouragement for us to bring out the market aspects of non-market activity such
as home labor. Her claim falls short of being for a richness of understanding that
includes economics as itself one creative force in personality. I hope to make the
claim for that possibility by bringing forward some of the negative aspects of
non-market understandings. I wish to do this while maintaining the notion that
neither an economic nor an emotional understanding of non-market activities is
intrinsic to the activities themselves. This latter point saves room for Radin's
desire to promote plural meaning, but it rests less on an implicit trajectory
toward an ideal of a singular, and for her non-market, conception.
Suppose human activity is multifaceted and will resist any singular,
encompassing description. Home labor, as with so many human activities or
attributes, cannot be understood entirely with economic reasoning. Economic
reasoning, however, can be one of several ways to interpret human activity that
will show us a facet of that activity and enrich our understanding of it. We
probably experience many things as such; the question is whether we are able to
highlight that experience. While this point might be raised by a critic of
economics because of the tendency among some economists to be essentialist in
their thinking, it also should rescue economic analysis for those who would
banish it entirely from legal discourse. If the problem is a lack of nuance among
economists, feminists should not employ a similar lack of nuance by rejecting
economic reasoning or, as in Radin's case, looking for its gradual demise.
Radin asks if we can both know the price of something and simultaneously
know that it is priceless. 74 I believe the answer is yes. An important illustration of
this point can be found in Viviana Rotman Zelizar's historical examination of

72. See id.
73. Id. at 107.
74. See id atlOl.
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the life insurance industry.75 In the first half of the nineteenth century there was
tremendous public resistance to the sale of life insurance in the United States
because the public took offense at the suggestion that a life could be valued in
monetary terms.76 The insurance industry responded to the resistance with a
pitch that was aimed at the idea that the life was not worth the money. Widows
needed to be cared for after the death of a spouse, and insurance would help with
that, although it would in no way replace the life lost.77 Under this conception,
the life insurance market took off. 78 Today's life insurance market does not
offend most people on commodification grounds, despite its known actuarial
focus.79 Life insurance is considered a kind and responsible purchase for family

members, who do not thereby come to view the insured loved one as bearing a
price. Students of insurance would argue that it is not about pricing life at all but
about subjectively chosen levels of risk. Thus, a "price" does not unseat the
understanding of pricelessness. The fact of a price does not create a market: we
would not accept the argument that since we price lives for insurance purposes,
we may also buy and sell people. Such an idea would only serve to show us that
the "price" does not capture the value. It instead serves a limited purpose that is
unrelated to real value.
Radin makes the interesting point that by promoting the exile of economic
understandings entirely, we implicitly grant too much power to that mode of
analysis.80 If we believe that the very existence of an economic discourse
destroys other understandings of the same phenomenon, we grant that economic
discourse has become a baseline that will always extinguish other
understandings if it is permitted to thrive.8 ' Elizabeth S. Anderson's analysis
displays this belief 82 That economics need not extinguish other perspectives will
be an important idea when thinking about the potentially important emotional
perspective on family labor.
Economics is a tool for identifying the allocational issues at play in a given
social setting. 83 An important implication of Radin's notion of plural meaning is
that where a plural or multifaceted understanding is employed, policy and legal
choices can be made that embody those plural understandings. This should be
important when thinking about the policy issues surrounding home labor. I argue
that the addition of some understanding of the economic significance of home

75. See VIViANA RoTMAN ZELIZAR, MORALS AND MARKETs: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LIFE INSURANCE IN
THE UNITED STATEs (1979).
76. See id. at 1-5, 41-46.

77. See id. at 94-96.
78.

See id.at 6-7, 102-105.

79. Some of the socially accepted understandings of life insurance may recently have become contested
as a result of the AIDS epidemic.
80. See RADIN, supra note 6, at 103.

81.

See id.

82.

See Anderson, supra note 8, at 87-89.

83. This is so even if, as White argues, "tools" are not themselves simple. See White, supra note 1, at
166.
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labor, without moving it into an unregulated market, would positively inform
legal discourse on the home.
Anderson is concerned that commodification of women's labor leads to the
exploitation of women because it gives only a commercial response to women's
noncommercial motivations.84 Anderson's analysis does not account for the
possibility of women's mixed motivations, or at minimum her analysis clearly
privileges the non-market motivations. Anderson's analysis also does not allow
for the possibility that responses that are noncommercial may exist even where
commercial responses exist.
Consider the benefits gained in the fields of sociology and economics from a
shift in understandings of home activity. 5 Before either field had made the
transition from seeing the home only as the site of consumption and affections to
seeing home activity as work, neither field had the occasion to ask the questions
that arise from that observation: what is this work like? Is it safe, efficient,
stressful? What are its standards and practices? How does it compare to market
work in terms of needed human capital development, productivity, and job
satisfaction? We ought to care very much about the answers to these questions.
The questions were not available to the eye of the economist or sociologist until
the notion of work was imported into the home. Legal analysis is very much in
need of the same opening of questions.
B. The Limited Influence of Talk in Legal Discourse: Plural Meaning as the
Norm
Does talking about home labor as productive mean commodifying it? It
becomes important to think about what is meant by commodification. To assume
that there is no important difference between analyzing the economics of
something and creating an unregulated market for that same thing is terribly
damaging to intellectual discourse. "Wages for housework" is not the only
possible outcome of this exercise. Even if there is only a difference of degree
between talk and real markets, as the commodification literature suggests, that
difference should matter for the purposes of legal analysis.
Rhetoric and real markets differ particularly in the legal context. We
routinely ask questions about value in legal practice as if a market exists where
one does not. Consider the wrongful death suit or any tort suit that includes a
claim for pain and suffering damages. The value of these claims is obviously not
established by a real market. Moreover, it is not difficult for most people to
accept that there should not ever be a real market in these things. Nonetheless, in
a tort action, we allow money to change hands as if a market value were placed
on these things. Cass Sunstein identifies this as "as if" reasoning. We think of
damages "as if' they could be marketized, but at the same time we know that
84. See Anderson, supra note 8, at 81.
85. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 15-21, for an extended discussion of this point.
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they cannot.86 This is a clear practical example of the existence of what Radin
calls plural meanings.
Monetization of things for which there is no market and no push for a market
for the purpose of providing a remedy within the law is an illustration of the
resilience of non-market conceptions. While legal academics may fret about the
message we are sending by placing a value on the loss of an arm, the non-legal
world does not appear to have been influenced into believing that arms are worth
an x sum of money, despite the many years that a monetary remedy has been
provided for the loss of an arm. Loss of consortium damages are an even better
example of this phenomenon. This routine fact of legal discourse should deflate
somewhat the worry over the domino effect if we decide to analyze legal policies
affecting home labor using economic understandings. Law's pragmatic focus on
remedies has not had an enormous spillover effect into social understandings in
non-legal discourse.
Consider the benefits of economic discourse in law about things that we
generally view as non-commodifiable. Accident victims who receive pain and
suffering damages are not likely to want to have those remedies taken away on
the grounds that the hedonic experience of pain is non-fungible or priceless.
Pretending that there is a market value to pain, although there is no true market
in pain, is a necessary part of improving the welfare of accident victims. This is a
partial answer to the question of whether we can know both the price of
something and that it is priceless. As lawyers we already do. Incommensurability
does not disappear; it simply does not paralyze.
The case of legal remedies is one illustration of a central argument of this
article. It is not enough to say that economic rhetoric has an impact on the
imagination and to give examples of where that impact is negative. Conceding
that rhetoric has an impact is not to concede that in all contexts that impact is
negative. It is a conservative leap, grounded in preserving current
understandings, to assume that it must be so. We see the creative potential of
economics as applied to well-known conventional legal remedies in the tort
context. The point is made more salient below when we look at the context of
home labor in particular.
C. The Needfor Economic Understandingsof Home Labor in Particular
Consider critics who argue that love and affections are a descriptively
accurate way of understanding and explaining productivity in the home. If plural
meaning is possible, the emotional account of home labor does not disappear in
the face of the economic account. It seems obvious that most labor, including
most wage labor, can be multifaceted. It is usually done in furtherance of some

86. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REv. 779, 815-816
(1994).
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family commitment, and is often substantively rewarding at a personal level as
well.
Having relieved ourselves of the burden of having a singular conception of
home labor, we can move on to aspects of home labor that justify the need for
economics as one of the plural understandings associated with that labor.
1. Comparison Between Commodification Concerns Over Wage Labor
Versus Home Labor
a. Similarities Between Waged and Unwaged Labor
What do waged and unwaged labor have in common? Both improve the
welfare of an individual or a family, and neither is leisure.87 Goods that are made
in the home and services that are provided by those who work in the home
produce value that improves the standard of living for all in the home in the
same way that a wage buys goods and services that improve the standard of
living in a home. A meal is prepared and clothes are cleaned because both
contribute to individual or collective welfare. Either can be performed at home or
purchased as a service with wages earned in the market. Purchase or selfperformance will lead to a similar result: an improvement in welfare.
A person is engaged in leisure activity or simply consuming if the only
benefit of her activity goes to her but no benefit would go to her if a third party
engaged in that activity for her. Thus, preparing a meal is not leisure because it
produces a meal that a worker might still enjoy if it were prepared for her. This is
different from true leisure, such as watching a movie, which can only be enjoyed
if you do it for yourself. Some people may enjoy meal preparation. Much labor,
paid and unpaid, has a leisure component in addition to a labor component, but
there is nothing unique about unpaid labor in this respect. 88
There is substantial sociological literature documenting the way in which
women's work is divided between paid and unpaid labor.89 Women spend
substantially more than half of their working hours doing unpaid labor, while
men spend less than a quarter of their working hours on unpaid labor. Women
enjoy fewer leisure hours than do men. 90 Allocating time to unpaid labor is a
choice that women make in considering how to improve the circumstances of
their families as well as their own circumstances. The social organization
whereby more of women's work is performed in the home than men's may result
from historic or current gender discrimination in law and culture, from women's
socially or biologically determined greater commitment to children, or from
other unexplored causes.
87.
1620-22
88.
89.
90.

See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 10-13; see also Nancy C. Staudt, Taxing Housework, GEO. L.J. 1571,
(1996) (discussing the literature dividing labor from leisure).
Seeid. at 10-13.
See id. (describing sociological literature on division of women's labor).
See id.
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Nonetheless, the fact that women perform more home labor should not
reduce the value of that work. Second wave feminism from the 1960s to the
present and the antidiscrimination laws of the same time period have brought
substantial changes in women's paid labor force participation, with a particular
increase among middle class women who had previously spent less time in the
paid labor market than lower income women. Yet this radical change in paid
labor force participation has not brought a similar change in the distribution of
home labor. The time men spend in home labor, reported as a fraction of the time
women spend, has changed only slightly, and that change is accounted for by a
slight drop in the amount of women's home labor, not an increase in men's
absolute hours.91 Home labor as an area of significant concern to women's
working lives does not appear to be temporary. Therefore, as I will argue below,
it is critical to push for the equality of treatment of that work with paid work, and
not just to seek the equality of treatment of both men and women in the paid
labor force.
b. The Case for Equality of Treatment Between Men's and Women's
Work
The significance of home labor in women's working lives endures, just as the
significance of wage labor in men's lives endures. The increasing significance of
wage labor in women's lives does not change this reality. Thus if we wish to be
vigilant in pursuit of gender equality, we should be vigilant in asking that
unwaged labor be subject to the same benefits and burdens as waged labor. If we
are willing to live with partially commodified wage labor or if we see a benefit to
it, we must have partially commodified home labor. This call for equal treatment
between waged and unwaged labor with respect to commodification concerns is
supported by several observations. The first observation is that wage labor is not
entirely commodified. The second is that home labor is already partially
commodified. The third is that affections motivate workers in the wage labor
market as they do in the home, both because wage laborers take work
relationships seriously and because wage laborers work on behalf of and for the
benefit of those with whom they have intimate relations.
Wage labor is not entirely commodified. While we might expect some law
and economists to use wage labor as an example of reasonably complete
commodification, Radin would contest that description. According to Radin, we
as a culture are conflicted between those aspects of wage labor that we recognize
as both fungible and as removed from personhood and those that we consider
integral to personhood. As a result, we do not have an actual free market in wage
labor, but instead regulate heavily in areas ranging from occupational safety to
collective bargaining to racial discrimination. Those regulations reflect a societal
91. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALrrY 78 (1988); Silbaugh, supra note
2, at 8-9.
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understanding of employment as having plural meaning; both marketable and
non-marketable attributes co-existing. No doubt, there is no societal consensus
on where the line of regulation should be drawn, but it is easy to see that plural
meanings have been and continue to be accommodated in the paid labor field.
Radin discusses wage labor in this respect, drawing on Hannah Arendt's
terminology of "work" versus "labor," but using the terms differently.92 To
Radin, work is partially commodified but has a non-commodified aspect, while
labor is entirely commodified--"Laborers are sellers: fully motivated by money,
93
exhausting the value of their activity in the measure of its exchange value.,
Fortunately, Radin thinks most people are workers. For workers, "there is an
irreducibly non-market or non-monetized aspect of human interaction going on
between seller and recipient, even though a sale is taking place at the same
time." 94 Unlike laborers, money does not fully motivate workers, and the value
of their activity cannot be fully understood by its price.9 5
While Radin does not discuss a scale by which one is a worker at one end
and a laborer at the other, she does discuss artists first and shoe salespeople later.
The difference between these, however, might matter to the culture at large when
deciding whether to worry about commodification. By this taxonomy, family
labor is toward the artist end of the spectrum; its non-market or personal
attributes dominate in the popular understanding. However, we might want to
object to the categorical assumptions made along this spectrum. Probably some
artists, and some family members, are almost entirely mercenary, and probably
some salespeople are "artists." Our policy understandings will be shallow if we
fail not only to see non-market aspects at work when they are obvious, as in the
case of the artist or the family laborer, but also when they are not obvious, as in
the case of the shoe salesperson. Radin wants to encourage us to foster the nonmarket aspects of all activities.
While I agree with Radin on this goal, I think the inverse goal is also
important: to see the economic aspect of activities that do not appear to be
economically motivated. If plurality of understanding is the goal, not just noncommodification, this is justified. For this reason, I encourage some attention to
the economics of home labor when making policy decisions, without forfeiting
what is uniquely personal about it.
What works for paid labor ought to work for domestic labor. The claim I
wish to make is that domestic labor embodies attributes of personhood that we
may think imprudent to commodify in a real market; but, at the same time, we
can understand domestic labor as susceptible to economic reasoning. The
comparison to wage labor is apt not only in bringing unwaged labor closer to the
wage labor standard, but also in understanding that the wage labor standard
92.
93.
94.
95.

See RADIN, supra note 6, at 105.
Id.
Id. at 107.
Seeld. at 105.
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contains seeds of the rejection of commodification that many feel should attach
to home labor.
Just as important to the call for equality between wage and home labor is the
observation that domestic labor is already commodified. There is already a
market (or could reasonably be a market) for almost every task that falls within
my description of home labor.96 There are clear concrete problems for paid
domestic workers that arise from a cultural desire to deny that this is so, as I
discuss below. There is also an interesting desire to distinguish paid domestic
work from unpaid domestic work, to distinguish what Dorothy Roberts calls the
menial from the spiritual.97 Consider the analysis of the childcare that people
provide to their own children by commodification critic James Boyd White:
"Such work cannot be segmented into functions and then made the material of
the market process, actual or hypothetical, for what the child requires is the
sustained presence of, and interaction with, a loving and respectful person,
something no alternative can supply."98 This distinction does not square with
many people's experiences. Race, class, and immigration status come to the
forefront when considering why the line between spiritual and menial labor is
drawn around paid domestic work; Roberts makes the case that this line is
racialized. 99 In addition, the important gender roles of the middle class
household, where there is no paid domestic labor, may be supported by a denial
of the reality of an existing market in home labor. Denying the reality of an
existing market assists in maintaining the image of the unpaid household laborer
as a non-worker, and creates an illusion of her work as simply an expression of
affections demonstrated through her activities.
A final potential substantive difference between waged and unwaged labor,
that could be the implicit ground on which to treat them differently, may be the
relationships surrounding home labor: the emotional relationship between the
worker and the beneficiaries. However, we can not universalize wage labor as
functioning without those relationships. Work in a family business can be waged
as can work in a small business, work in a sole proprietor business, or work in
the home as paid domestic labor. Even work in a large business includes
important localized relationships among workers. Moreover, most people in the
wage labor market probably consider family members to be beneficiaries of their
work through wages returned to the family. Indeed, Arlie Hochschild, who
popularized the concern over women's double work day in her 1989 book, The
Second Shift,100 has turned her focus to the study of the relational significance of

96. That there is or at least could be a market is important to the definitional line between labor and
leisure. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 10-11.
97. See Dorothy E. Roberts, Spiritual and Menial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51 (1997).
98. White, supra note 1, at 190.

99. See Dorothy E. Roberts, SpiritualandMenial Housework, 9 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 51 (1997).
100. See Arlie Russell Hochschild, Work: The Great Escape, N.Y TIMES, Apr. 20, 1997, §6
(Magazine), at 50.
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wage labor. She concludes that individuals today seek and find many of the
emotional benefits of family life in the workplace now that the home carries the
burden that was once associated with the rushed workday.
The claim for equality in how we treat work, both men's and women's,
proceeds on several fronts. It can not be especially harnful to commodify
women's work; instead, it carries the same risks, not qualitatively worse ones, as
other types of work. In saying this, we must be mindful of several things. First,
wage labor is not fully commodified, and domestic labor is already partially
commodified. Second, it may be argued that the relationships between workers
and beneficiaries is substantively different for paid and unpaid workers. But we
may decide that that is a line too starkly drawn. Not only do most workers in the
paid labor market consider family members to be the beneficiaries of their work,
but much paid work also involves family-like relationships, sometimes literally,
as in a family business, and sometimes metaphorically.
Finally, we should question why the substantive line between commodifiable
and non-commodifiable labor is also a substantive gender line. This point is
discussed below, where I note that many of the areas where commodification
concerns arise touch on women's labor. Given that fact, we will need to question
what notions of femininity govern in those situations.
2. Women as Non-commodifiable: Questioningthe Originsof an Idea
Does concern about the comparison between wage labor and home labor
commodification grow out of an implicit assumption that there is something
intrinsically different about home labor? We might want to ask whether it is
coincidental, or instead highly relevant, that that intrinsic difference. at play in
analysis also cuts along gender lines: women's work, hereby, would be
essentially non-marketable. Consider the problems with assuming that women
are inclined to make gifts of attributes of their personalities. Women serve, men
sell. It is a familiar notion about which many feminists have been skeptical. 01
a. The Gender Line: Cashless Women
At a practical level, women should at least be wary of anti-commodification
arguments, because these arguments arise when women receive money for
something, not when women are paying money for something. The argument is
used most frequently in legal discourse when talking about women receiving
money for surrogate parenting and sexual contact, and herein for household
labor. While Radin extends the argument into gender neutral territories, such as

101. See, e.g., JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, PUBuC MAN, PRIVATE WOMAN: WOMEN IN SOCIA AND
POLMCAL THOUGHT (1987); Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal
Reform, 96 HARv. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
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housing, most of the commodification red flags are raised by her and by others
when discussing women's commodification.
One might respond that the emphasis of the anticommodification argument
is that some aspect of women's personhood is going to be sold, not that women
are about to receive money. It is the sale that is objectionable, not that women
may end up with cash. Consider, though, that it is not uncommon to find people
who approve of altruistic transfer in these same areas, for example, human egg
donation and surrogacy. In fact, the current fee caps in both of these fields reflect
that ideal in practice: donors are not supposed to be too motivated by money, so
fees are held down to ensure that there is a partially altruistic motivation for
donating. 10 2 In these cases, it seems arguable that the difference that a woman
experiences may simply be whether money comes to her, and how much, as
compared to other wage labor that she might similarly perform from partially
altruistic motivation. 10 3 This difference occurs in the name of noncommodification. It is worth asking whether Anderson's concern about
exploitation due to the commodification of women's reproductive capacity might
just as easily turn into exploitation from non-commodification, not just in a
"nonideal" world. Here the mixed motivations of women are exploited by
highlighting the altruistic aspects of those motives in a discriminatory fashion.
Only women ' mixed motives relating to feminine activities are highlighted and
offered as justification for leaving women without cash. Mixed motivations in
the labor force at large do not require regulatory practices aimed at keeping
wages down.
Social practices also exist where the characterization of the problem as
"withholding money from women" seems even more apt at the practical level
than "preventing the sale of women," given the particular form that current
decommodification takes. Prostitutes and pimps have a relationship that results
where prohibition on sale ensures that although a female attribute is being sold, a
woman is not getting most of the money. The "transitional balancing" questions
raised by commodification and prostitution have been widely debated elsewhere.
I raise it to illustrate that protecting women from sale does not necessarily go
hand in hand with preventing women from receiving cash. Women can be sold
and remain relatively cashless. Few would argue that the current form of the
criminalization of prostitution is intended or designed for the protection of
prostitutes, and so the lack of connection between non-commodification (and its
female cashlessness) and sale is hardly remarkable. But in the reproductive areas
of surrogacy and egg donation, non-commodification ideals drive the policy of
leaving women relatively cashless despite their (partial?) sale.

102. See Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLuM. L. REv. 375, 451 (1996); Sharon Lemer,
The Price ofEggs; Undercover in the Infertility Industry, Ms., Mar./Apr. 1996, at 28, 29, 34.
103. Think of a school teacher, for example. This is the lay understanding of altruism, not the
economists' understanding of human behavior, which resists the existence of altruism.
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We do not usually see the anticommodification argument raised as forcefully
when things typically associated with male personhood are being sold. While it
may be that women's personhood is more at risk for being inappropriately
objectified and commercialized, we should at least consider an alternative
understanding of why commodification concerns focus on women's issues. It
may have as much to do with notions of femininity and a desire to elevate a
romantic essentialism about femininity as it does with a desire to protect
women's integrity. Consider Anderson's argument that women's reproductive
labor is inappropriately alienated by surrogacy because a surrogate mother must
"divert [her labor] from the end which the social practices of pregnancy rightly
promote-an emotional bond with her child."' 4 It is not clear why the end
which Anderson prefers for women's labor must be extinguished by money, but
it is clear that her argument leaves women without money for their labor. If a
reinscription of the public-private spheres ideology on which market rhetoric
thrives occurs around women's home labor, it may depend on a particular notion
of femininity that has as one of its characteristics cashless women. Perhaps
Anderson recognizes this, but sees it as a necessary trade-off for the preservation
of familial bonds. 10 5 She does not explain though, why it is a trade-off; why
markets and monetary exchange cannot coexist with expressions of affection in a
realistic reflection of women's mixed motivations. We have the example of wage
labor as an area where monetary exchange and mixed motivations coexist.
This is not to say that the anticommodification argument is insincere. But at
least Radin readily admits that gut instinct plays a significant, perhaps deciding
role in drawing a line between things essential to personhood that should not be
commodified, and things that are less essential to personhood and therefore can
be commodified. 10 6 These "gut instincts" must be informed by cultural gender
understandings.
It certainly seems plausible that what makes us uncomfortable about selling
female reproductive capacity, for example, is its subversion of the motherhood
role, not just its potential to lead to exploitation. In contrast, consider the rather
dull response to the sale of sperm. Attaching anticommodification concerns only
to women is a reincarnation of the old public-private split, whereby things
feminine are non-market. Domestic labor has such a strong parallel with wage
labor in terms of its content and the role it plays in a worker's life that the
anticommodification concern07raised against only home labor seems a clear case
of reinscribing gender roles. 1

104. ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 82.
105. See ANDERSON, supra note 8, at 182-85.
106. See RADIN, CONTESTED CoMMODrITEs, supra note 6, at 11-12.

107. This point is slightly less visible in the case of surrogacy. The male parallel (sperm donation) is
freely marketable, because the female counter-part (pregnancy) is restricted in the market: thus a male-female
split on the appropriateness of commodification occurs. However, while the two practices (pregnancy and
sperm donation) are very different in substance from one another, other rationales for their different treatment
obscure the importance of reinscription of gender roles.
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Certainly there is room for the argument that commodification of things like
housing and wage labor harms male personhood. The fact that we are more
concerned about commodification of women's personhood does not mean that
we have erred with respect to women; we might have erred with respect to men.
Radin's work suggests this. But we must at least consider the gender line in the
anticommodification discourse and its possible origins in gut instincts, including
our own, which we might not want to trust. And in deciding whether we are right
to permit partialcommodification of "men's" personal attributes, such as wage
labor, we need to ask which gut instinct is stronger: the one that permits wage
labor, or the one that doesn't permit market analysis of home labor. The partial
commodification of wage labor is acceptable to most people in a world of scarce
resources that is as thoroughly organized around markets as our own. Much that
is personal is created and produced on the market, and home labor is not special
in that respect.
This argument reinforces my claim for the equality of treatment between
home and wage labor, and further suggests that different treatment on
commodification grounds tracks different treatment in other areas, such as
reproductive capacities, while falling straight down gender lines.
b. Help from the History of Notions of Domestic Labor
As argued above, we should care whether surrogacy contracts, for example,
might be illegal to preserve the human dignity of child and mother, or because
the mother undermines traditional family roles by selling her reproductive
capacity. We must also be skeptical of our ability to produce a coherent answer
to that question. Similarly, we need to know why we instinctively resist the
commodification of home labor. There may be a difference between noncommodified values at a deep level and sentimentalization.
To sort that difference out, we have to scrutinize what women are actually
doing in the home, and not put the work women are doing on a pedestal. It is
dangerous to pretend that domestic labor is not understood as work because there
is something essentially too close to personal human identity in performing this
work. The crucial question is whether it is not understood as work because
women do it that is, whether work within the home is doctrinally cast as an
expression of affection at least in part because that justifies women's inferior
economic status.
One way to explore the difference is through a search of doctrinal origins.
Here, Reva Siegel's work is particularly useful.' 0 8 She claims that
sentimentalization of women's home labor happened as a mechanism for
108. See Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman 's Rights Claims Concerning Wives'
Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994); Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital
Status Law: Adjudicating Wives' Rights to Earnings, 1860-1930, 82 GEo. L.J. 2168, 2181-96 (1994). See
also Amy Dru Stanley, Conjugal Bonds and Wage Labor: Rights of Contract in the Age of Emancipation, 75
J. Am.HIST. 472 (1988).
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maintaining gender stratification in the face of a moment of possible
transformation for status relations. If the sentimental notion of home labor in law

is arguably bom out of instrumentalism working against women, then we want to
be careful saying that those sentimental notions are integrally connected to
women's human dignity. Siegel has tracked the legal response to the Married
Women's Property Acts and the Earnings Statutes of the nineteenth century.
Before their enactment, legal understanding of women's home labor had been
clearly and openly economic, with men owning their wives' labor and that labor
viewed as of primarily monetary value. Both statutory reforms had the potential
to completely change the status relationships between husbands and wives and
the texts of the statutes suggested they could do so by giving wives economic
rights in all their labor, including their labor at home. But Siegel carefully
examines the early judicial interpretations of those statutes and concludes that
judges limited them so as not to disrupt labor relations within the home. They
did so by minimizing the economic significance of home labor that had been
openly acknowledged in the past. They instead introduced a sentimentality to
home labor that had not previously informed legal discourse, even though it was
available in the discourse outside of law at the time. The history of how this
work became sentimentalized tells us that it was not women who infused the
work with its domestic love aura.
This is not to say that the suspicious origins of the idea that home labor is
something other than wealth-generating can decide whether or not we ought to
look at home labor that way today. Origins are not decisive. I have, for example,
argued that the questionable gender presumptions of Gary Becker and the
original proponents of economic understandings of the family should not prevent
feminists from employing economic understandings. But if the different
understandings of unwaged home labor and wage labor are not intrinsic, if they
are historically placed, then we should be asking whether it is particularly helpful
or instead harmful at this point in time to be viewing home labor as different
from wage labor.

The foregoing should serve as a partial response to Anderson's concern that
commodification invites exploitation. It seems just as plausible to argue that
pricelessness invites exploitation. Refusing to consider the economics of home
labor perpetuates the idea that women are inclined to serve and to gift their work.
It would be a strange scenario whereby affections that accompany labor penalize
rather than enhance the value of that labor, admitting that value has a material
component for women as well as for men.
Even if rhetoric influences relations, the foregoing should leave us
wondering why those who are interested in the impact of rhetoric dislike
economics so strongly. The belief that rhetoric may reorganize understanding
does not demonstrate that there is no role for economics if reorganization is in
order. To the contrary, if there is power in the observation that analysis can
remake relations, economic analysis may be an important creative force in this
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particular context where current relations are not ideal. This single context,
where gender relations might benefit from the reimagining that economics might
provide, throws a wrench into the general claim that economics should be
"vigorously resist[ed]"' 9 because language may be constitutive. That claim
must instead recognize context.
IV. APPLICATIONS OF THE ARGUMENT

The anticommodification literature routinely treats commodification, or
partial commodification, as a necessary evil where it applies. Radin has
identified this as the double-bind: wanting a perfect world of noncommodification, but accepting that commodification may be necessary in an
imperfect world. I think the case for economic or market reasoning can be made
more affirmatively than that.
Consider White's argument that the way we speak has a constitutive effect
on what we speak about. 10 To White, this is a strong argument against economic
rhetoric."' But it is not evident why this must follow from his analysis. Even if
economic rhetoric remakes relations, that may be a positive development in
some areas, with domestic labor being a prime example. White's analysis
purports to critique economic rhetoric as an abstract idea to be "vigorously
resist[ed]."" 2 There is something quite conservative about this conclusion: it
depends on the idea that there is something very valuable to preserve in current
discourse. That discourse does not float in the air, but it has a particular context,
and we need to look at that context to know whether remaking understandings
would be a positive or negative development.
I think it is important to consider the costs of sentimentality. What harms are
created by an ideal of non-commodification? One answer might be in the gender
equality argument made above. A second might lie in concrete doctrine:
economics is not a necessary evil but an additional tool of analysis that permits
us to see one more facet of a phenomenon. That new angle opens up additional
creative opportunities for problem-solving. My task in this Article is not only to
make a space for economic understandings in the abstract. I am interested in the
benefits of an economic perspective on domestic labor. In that light,
consideration should be given to what economics can add to the following
concrete doctrinal problems associated with home labor.

109.
110.
111.
112.

White, supra note 1,at 166.
Seeid.at 161, 164.
Seeid. at 170-74.
Id. at 161, 164.
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A Welfare
Nowhere is the need for an economic perspective on women's domestic labor
more pressing than in the welfare discourse. Mothers who receive Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) are almost by definition caregivers to
those children. Children in poverty who are eligible for aid need not only
marketable goods, such as food, shelter and clothing; but they also need
supervision, education, household management including food preparation and
laundry, and caregiving to ensure a measure of personal welfare. Typically, they
receive the latter from a parent, usually a mother or another woman who plays a
mothering role.
It is not a difficult task for an economist to attach economic value to this
contribution by an AFDC parent.' 13 The New Home Economists have brought
an analysis to divorce law that gives an account of women's caregiving and
home management as contributing to family wealth and welfare in a manner that
is economically equivalent to wage labor. Although these economists have
focused their energies on divorce law which applies primarily to the middle and
upper classes, the work performed by caregivers is in many ways similar across
class lines. To the late twentieth century economist, there is moral equivalence
between paid and unpaid work in terms of productivity. The economist also
brings an understanding of what will be lost in terms of non-monetary income,
and material welfare, if an unpaid worker must reallocate her time to paid labor.
In contrast, the all-too-familiar complaint that the welfare system itself is
responsible for poverty is built on an understanding that home labor is not, in
fact, work. In the words of former presidential candidate Robert Dole:
[R]eal welfare reform must include a real work requirement, which in no
uncertain terms requires able-bodied welfare recipients to find a job, not
stay at home, and not stay in a training program forever, but to go to
work in a job, hopefully in a real job in the private sector. When it comes
to escaping poverty, we know that the old American work ethic was true,
4
because work works."
Dole's comments reflect the common refrain in the public discourse on welfare:
welfare recipients by definition do not work; a work ethic must be cultivated
among welfare recipients, and real work is at a job in the private sector, not
staying at home. If we bring an economic understanding to home labor, Dole's
comments seem fraught with troubling analysis. Moreover, potential solutions to

113. In fact, when all the rhetoric at the most public level shakes away, many in the hands-on public
policy arena can comprehend the difficulties associated with a work requirement for mothers of very small
children, which explains how assistance with childcare manages to appear in the debates at all.
114. Excerpts From Dole and Clinton Speeches on Redoing Welfare, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 1, 1995, at AlO.
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the welfare "problem" would be much better crafted were the productivity of
childrearing a factor in the analysis.
For those who think that the role of caretaking in the home is significant, this
common spin on welfare is problematic. But one might respond with a case for
public support of childrearing that does not use economic rhetoric. We might
instead argue that mothering is a competing value with work, equally deserving
of society's active support. We would not be arguing that childrearing, or
mothering, as Martha Fineman calls it," l ' is itself work, but only that Dole is
wrong in placing work above all else. What is gained by arguing that home labor
is economically and morally equivalent to wage labor?
The answer is partially strategic. If the moral claim for societal support of
wage labor proceeds on the theory that wage labor can be judged by a certain set
of criteria, if unpaid domestic labor measures up to wage labor on these same
terms, then society should support home labor. If this were a purely instrumental
point, it might seem an inappropriate argument at the academic level, being
appropriate instead only for a strategy room. But more might be said for this
approach, if Dole's basic instinct that work is valuable has any merit.
Sociologist William Julius Wilson has argued that work is the organizing
structure of the human biography.' 1 6 In this regard, he sounds like many
neoconservative academics and commentators who fault a "culture of poverty,"
meaning a culture where work is not valued, for the economic plight of the very
poor in American urban areas. But unlike these neoconservatives, Wilson argues
that joblessness is a result of economic structure, which creates social isolation
among those who cannot find work. 17 Wilson is friendlier than most liberals to
the notion that there may be a distorted work ethic among the "truly
disadvantaged," but he views that ethic as the result ofjoblessness, not the cause
of joblessness. Unfortunately, Wilson does not go the extra step in asking
whether uncompensated labor in the home demonstrates a healthy work ethic.
Instead, he favors policies that promote paid employment on an equal basis for
all Americans. 1 8 Wilson taps into an understanding of the importance of work
on which there is a broad societal consensus. Wilson may be right that work is
deeply understood as an organizing structure of human biography, and he may
be very much in need of a better economic understanding of unpaid home labor
in order to bring it within his definition of work.' 19
Consider the argument put forward by Mark Kelman. 120 Kelman defends the
decision not to tax imputed income because it preserves individual liberty to
115. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND OTHER
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 233-35(1995).
116. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, WHEN WORK DISAPPEARS 73-75(1996).
117. See WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 55-62, 137-39 (1987).
118. See id. at 109-24.
119. See id; WILsoN, supra note 116, at 73-75.
120. Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal"Income Tax
and Why They Fit Worse in a Far from Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 880 (1979). I am indebted to
Nancy Staudt for drawing me to this example.
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conduct private activities outside the market. His line is market and non-market,
rather than productive versus unproductive. Kelman makes no distinction here
between underutilizing skills by, for example, training as a physician but
spending your days on the beach and working without pay in the home. This is
an insult to the unpaid home laborer and highlights the difficulty with deemphasizing the economic nature of home labor. Should the value of home labor
rise and fall with the value of sunbathing? Even most people who are truly
sympathetic with welfare recipients would agree with Wilson in putting work
above leisure as a personal good. Consequently, it is particularly important to
appreciate the economic aspects of the activities of an AFDC mother who is
taking care of her children.
Economic rhetoric in this context has an important dignitary component. It
recovers women's work from the misunderstanding that it is unproductive, and
that the ethic it reflects is similar to that of the sunbather. It also has an important
pragmatic, policy component. The need for substitute care, not as an
afterthought, but as a core economic difficulty with workfare programs, needs to
21
be better understood in the mainstream debate on welfare. 1
B. PaidDomestic Workers
Paid domestic labor is still almost exclusively done by women, but as a
profession is not representative of women across racial and socio-economic
lines. Instead, paid domestic laborers are historically and presently
overwhelmingly women of color, immigrants, or both. According to the Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 691,000 people are "private household workers" in the U.S.,
meaning that they perform either childcare or cleaning in a private home for
pay. 122 There are another 555,400 recorded as doing home health care for pay,
and 501,900 providing child day care outside of the home for pay.12 These three
categories alone represent 1,748,300 workers of record. Almost all are women:
96.3% of the 691,000 private household workers. 124 The majority of those who
perform housecleaning are Black or Hispanic (fifty-one percent). A substantially
disproportionate number of private household workers overall are Black or

121. One might argue that the very existence of welfare represents a recognition of the value of
childrearing. But benefits under the Social Security Act are tailored to the kinds of familial relationships that
have been historically in place in a given family, not to the work done. In other words, a widow receives more
under the SSA for her work than a never-married, despite the similarity of their work. This weakens
considerably any claim that payment is for work; rather, as I argued in Turning Labor into Love, supra note 2,
at 38-41, 67-72, payment is for relationships, for love.
122. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS A-25
(Feb. 1996).
123. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT, HOURS AND
EARNINGS, U. S. 1990-1995 (Sept 1995).
124. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, FWPLOniET AND E4RmNw,
MONTHLY, JANUARY 1994, Tl. No. 649 (Jan. 1994).
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Hispanic (nearly forty-four percent). 12 These statistics do not include launderers,
drivers, secretaries, gardeners, dog walkers, grocery delivery workers, or the
numerous other job classifications that encompass the work of the unpaid
26
household worker.1
Thus, discussions of whether home labor should be commodified proceed
from the outset on a premise that insults the population of women who already
perform domestic labor for pay. Quite simply, the market already exists. Paid
domestic workers bear an extremely unfair burden generated by the precise mode
of analysis I criticize: the desire to construe home labor as something other than
work. The problem of the pricelessness of unpaid home labor bears down on the
paid domestic laborer, both in broad social understandings and concretely
through impairment of the ability to achieve a remotely even playing field on
which to sell her labor. The former point can be illustrated through an
examination of a few of the labor laws that apply to paid domestic workers. The
latter point can be illustrated through a look at the tax treatment of unpaid labor.
Domestic workers are explicitly exempted from coverage under the National
Labor Relations Act, 127 the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) 128 and
almost all Workers' Compensation statutes. 129 These exemptions are not on
grounds related to the size of the employer or the number of employees.130 From
the NLRA, there is no available legislative history explaining the exemption. But
there is a suggestion from early state labor law that the exemption is directly
related to the idea that the home is about emotions, not industry. A 1939 case
refused to give a domestic worker the right to picket his worksite under state
labor law because the home is "the abiding place of affections, esp[ecially]
domestic affections.' 13' This notion of affections, so prevalent in describing the
home labor of the unpaid houseworker, stripped the paid domestic worker of her
basic employment rights under labor laws. The OSHA exemption applies only to
"ordinary domestic household tasks" such as cooking, childcare and cleaning. 132
From OSHA the exemption is said to be "on public policy grounds," which go
entirely unstated.1 33 If this is to mean that the grounds are supposed to be
125. Id. The terms "Black" and "Hispanic" are those used by the Census Bureau in gathering the
foregoing data, and thus the survey participants are self-identified as such at least for the purposes of
answering the survey.

126. I could only obtain racial classifications for the private household worker data, not for the home
health care or public day care data, thus the incomplete reporting of race data here.
127. 29U.S.C.S. § 152(3) (Law Co-op. 1996).

128. 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (1995).
129. 4 ARTHUR LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION app. A-5-1 (1995); Silbaugh, supra

note 2, at 78.
130. The exception is that some workers' compensation laws apply to domestic workers when two or
more are employed full-time at the same site. Those states, however, do not have that limitation on other

employees who work as sole employees outside the home. For a thorough discussion of the doctrine discussed
here, see Silbaugh, supra note 2,at 72-79.
131. State v. Cooper, 285 NW. 903, 905 (Minn. 1939) (quoting WEBSTER'S NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (2d ed. 1935)).
132. 29 C.F.R. § 1975.6 (1995).
133. Id.
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obvious, we can only again wonder why it should be obvious that paid domestic
workers are different from all other paid workers to whom society feels it should
guarantee a safe work environment. The attempt to remove paid domestic
workers from the formal economy is one serious consequence of the general
desire to view household labor of either sort as being without economic
consequence.
Economic understanding can help us even more concretely to understand
some of the reasons, in addition to those of race and class stratification, why paid
domestic labor is so poorly compensated. There is a reasonable argument, which
I will set out below, that unpaid domestic labor receives a tax subsidy, while paid
domestic labor does not. Therefore, the price that can be charged for paid
domestic labor must be lower than it otherwise could be in order to compete with
the tax-subsidy given to unpaid domestic labor. Once explained, this point
underscores the benefits of economic analysis applied to domestic labor, in this
case revealing a market distortion that works against paid domestic workers.
Housework performed in the home by a family member is not "taxable
income" for the purposes of the federal income tax, despite the general rule that
non-monetary income and income from informal economies is taxable. 134 The
exception is for income that does not come from a market bargain, whether it is
monetary or not. This is thought to exclude household labor, which is prejudged
as unbargained-for.135 Economists and many tax scholars have recognized the
difficult distortions that the failure to tax imputed income introduces into the
family economy both in terms of decision-making as to paid labor force
participation versus home labor and in terms of distributional issues surrounding
government benefits. 36 The failure to tax imputed income from unpaid
household labor works as a tax subsidy to the choice of unwaged over wage
labor, and a tax subsidy to unpaid home labor in particular. As a result, a person
deciding whether to allocate time to paid or to unpaid labor may take account of
the extent to which wages from paid labor will be reduced by taxes, while value
produced by home labor will be enjoyed in full. It seems plausible that there are
cases where this calculation does occur, as women figure out the high cost of
returning to the paid labor force after the birth of a child and consider the cost of
purchasing childcare out of after-tax wages when they could provide that
childcare themselves without taxation. Recent scholarship on this topic relies on
an understanding of the economic productivity of home labor, and is an example
of the insights that can come from an economic understanding.
So far analysis within the tax context has only examined the impact of tax
subsidies on the unpaid houseworker. However, the failure to tax unpaid
134. See Staudt, supra note 5, at 1575-76.
135. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 52-54.

136. For the decision-making component, see Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh
Look at Behavioral Gender Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983 (1993); and Richard A. Posner,
Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CI. LEGAL F. 191. For the issue of the distribution of government benefits,
see Staudt, supra note 5.
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housework also impacts the paid domestic worker. Since the majority of home
labor is unpaid, the paid domestic worker competes for a wage against a taxsubsidized unpaid worker. This may be one of the factors that drives down the
wages of paid domestic workers. 137 This hypothesis should be explored by
economists, and if it appears valid, should be an important public policy issue
for law reform. This issue could not be understood without an understanding of
the economic productivity of home labor and of the wealth created by it.
The paid domestic worker is the victim by association with the unpaid
domestic worker, both by suggestion and directly. First, the paid worker is denied
the benefits of labor law, in some cases explicitly on the grounds that the home is
the site of affections, or that housework, as distinct from other work in the home,
raises unique but unspecified public policy concerns. Like the unpaid worker, the
paid domestic worker's job is something different from all other work, whether
performed in a house, as a sole employee, or part-time. The waged and unwaged
domestic workers are conflated. When one fails to see the unpaid domestic
laborer in economic terms, it becomes more difficult to see the paid domestic
laborer in economic terms. This might help to explain the absence of labor law
protections to paid domestic workers. The families who employ domestic
workers join in this perspective; the household that is safe enough for their
domestic life must be beyond government safety regulations for their employees.
Second, in addition to that suggestive function, the failure to understand unpaid
labor in economic terms has a more direct impact. By not taxing unpaid home
labor, the competitive price of paid home labor is reduced. This reduction may
assist in perpetuating poverty among paid domestic workers. Conversely, at
those times when a price might be placed on unpaid home labor in law, as in the
wrongful death suit or the divorce context, that price has been deflated by
distortions in the market for paid domestic labor.
C. SocialSecurity
The system of compensating unpaid home laborers through spousal and
survivor's benefits reveals a legal and cultural reliance on the family economy to
provide old-age security to home laborers. Home laborers receive social security
only if they are married or were once married for at least ten years to the same
person, and cannot combine that benefit with credits in the social security system
accrued on their own accounts in the paid labor market if they have spent some
time working in each place. 138 This makes home laborers vulnerable to the
vicissitudes of family structure, thereby both limiting their choices as to family
structure and placing the burden of an unchosen unconventional family structure
137. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 79-83.
138. See FmllMAN, supra note 115 (pointing out legal and cultural reliance on family to handle

dependencies in many contexts, and using welfare/SSI as one example); Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the
Struggle: Sex Discrimination,Social Security and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet ConstitutionalLaw,

89 COLUM. L. REV. 264 passim (1989); Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 38-41.
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on the shoulders of home laborers. For the paid worker, these family structure
issues are irrelevant to entitlement under the system.
A social security system that provides for unpaid domestic workers on their
own account would be far superior to the system we currently have. One option
would be a guaranteed income support to all citizens. This system, however,
would be a huge departure from our current work-based system, since it would
need to include both the sunbather and the childrearer on equal footing. Less of a
departure is possible. An economic understanding of the productivity of home
labor could permit home laborers to stand on their own in the social security
system just as wage laborers do. Contributions could be made to the social
security system for being materially productive. These contributions could be
made on either a voluntary basis or on a mandatory basis as the participation of
wage laborers is mandatory. 39 But contributions from unpaid laborers cannot be
assessed without some method of calculation. Economic valuation on which to
1 40
base contributions in the absence of a real market is complicated but possible,
but not if we foreclose economic understandings of home labor on
commodification grounds.
D. Contracts
The area of contract law that most directly implicates home labor is the law
of premarital or marital agreements.14 ' This peculiar set of rules reveals a
rejection of an economic understanding of home labor in favor of a highly
sentimental one. Although this has not always been the case, when spouses today
sign an agreement with regard to the disposition of either property or income in
the event of death or divorce, courts will generally enforce it. 142 In this respect,
courts recognize a right of contract between spouses over what are overtly
financial matters. This right is used primarily to protect financial assets and
income owned and earned by one spouse from the other.
However, when spouses sign an agreement whereby one will pay the other
for home labor, courts will not enforce it. 143 This refusal rests in part on some
historical peculiarities of family law: husbands traditionally owned their wives'
labor, and so it would not make sense for them to pay for it. This history surfaces
in cases today, where courts find that the houseworker has offered no
139. There are pros and cons to making a social security system for unpaid workers voluntary versus
mandatory. While the mandatory system would ensure full coverage, many families would have cashflow

difficulties making payments when there is no cash income from which to deduct them.
140. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 79-81 (discussing the various methods used by economists to
estimate the value of unpaid labor, as well as their strengths and weaknesses).
141. For an extensive discussion of the doctrinal issues raised here, see Silbaugh supra note 2, at 28-36.
142. There are qualifications here. In some states, courts will examine the agreement for substantive
overreaching under a standard that appears to be more substantive than the traditional unconscionability
doctrine in ordinary contract law. Not all courts do this, however. Some states are also more inclined to enforce
an agreement touching on the disposition of property than on the disposition of income, while most states draw
no distinction between the two. Id. at 31.
143. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 32-38 & n. 115.
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consideration for the contract because she is only doing what she is legally
obligated to do. 144 This reasoning is supplemented by an updated rationale:
home labor is not about money, or ought not to be about money, but is instead
about marital love and affections. 145 These courts reason that despite the parties'
agreement to monetize the home labor, it is of a personal nature that removes it
from the sphere of ordinary premarital agreements. It should be noted that courts
do not raise difficulties with enforcement or monitoring of such agreements as a
reason to treat them differently from premarital agreements goveming property
and wages. 146

The result of courts' treatment of home labor is a striking inequality in the
treatment of waged versus unwaged labor, or traditionally male versus
traditionally female labor. The fact that wage labor is "financial" hardly makes it
irrelevant to familial care and emotions. Most people work for wages in order to
spend those wages caring for family. In this respect, we are permitting
agreements now that are deeply personal simply because we perceive them as of
an economic nature.
Once again, the question arises: are enforceable housework agreements a
utopian vision? The preceding analysis cannot answer that question, being one of
the substance of legal marriage. However, my analysis insists that the answer be
the same for unwaged labor as it is for waged labor. To create equality between
waged and unwaged labor, one must have an economic understanding of home
labor. Economics advances our understanding of the multifaceted nature of
activities within the home.
That which can be monetized can be owned in premarital agreements, and
protected from a spouse in premarital agreements. That which is not monetized
cannot be bargained for legally, carries no personal entitlement, and receives no
protection. This problem of monetizable interests receiving protection while nonmonetizable interests do not implicates many women's interests in marriage,
such as caretaking, homemaking and child custody. An economic understanding
of home labor is once again critical to achieving equality of treatment between
men's work and women's work. Whatever commodification risks attend to
enforcing housework agreements attend equally to enforcing agreements that
keep wages and property inaccessible to a spouse. The broader question, whether
any of these agreements ought to be enforceable, can be better answered once the
economic equality between waged and unwaged labor is understood.

144. Of course that duty is now stated in gender neutral terms.
145. See, e.g. Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Cal. Ct App. 1993); State v. Bachmann, 521
N.W2d 886, 888 (Minn. Ct App. 1994); Hughes v. Lord, 602 P.2d 1030, 1031 (N.M. 1979); Kuder v.
Schroeder, 430 S.E.2d 271, 272-73 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
146. I am aware of no housework for wages case where this concern is raised, even tangentially, as a
reason to be concerned about enforcement.
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E. Divorce
Divorce law presents more opportunities to use economic understandings of
home labor, and in this area legal academics have done so with increasing
frequency. 147 However, more opportunities remain. For example, the division of
property upon divorce shows what an economic understanding can bring that is
currently missing to a discussion of family law policy. While most families have
no substantial assets to divide at divorce and instead live off of earned income,
the property example illustrates the tendency of judges to ignore the economic
understanding of home labor. Before the divorce reform of the last 30 years,
divorce meant that property, when there was any to distribute, remained with its
owner of record, usually the male wage earner. 148 Following the divorce-law
reforms in many states, courts have begun to consider the source of wealth as
relevant to distribution upon divorce, in addition to record of ownership. This
change is beneficial to women because these reformed statutes require courts to
consider not only the contributions of a wage-earner to the accumulation of
wealth, but also the contributions of a homemaker. This development shows a
subtle understanding of the role of home labor in wealth creation. When the
family owns property, not only the wage-eamer, but the home laborer as well, has
worked to accumulate that property, whether directly by increasing the value of
the asset through unpaid labor as through home improvements, or indirectly by
providing day-to-day family subsistence that freed up cash for the purchase of
assets. The statutes have increasingly been interpreted to mean that full-time
homemakers, under this specific provision, can receive a substantial portion of
family wealth even if it was purchased with cash held in the name of a full-time
wage-earning spouse. In some states, this has become a presumption of a 50-50
split of assets.
One might guess from this emerging jurisprudence that courts are
comprehending the economic significance of home labor. But there are hints that
this is not the case. It appears that courts are instead reinterpreting marital
obligations as requiring wealth sharing without regard to contribution. 149 If this
is the case, I do not argue that this is normatively undesirable. To the contrary, it
may reflect some aspects of a better substantive marriage law to de-emphasize
contribution altogether.150 But under current law, where contribution to wealth
147. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE ILLUSION OF EQUALrrY: THE RHETORIC AND
REALrry OF DIVORCE REFORM (1991); ALLEN M. PARKMAN, No-FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 6-7,
130-37 (1992); Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics ofAlimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35 (1978); Posner, supranote
28; Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the DisplacedHomemaker A Discourse on Playingwith Dolls, Partnership
Buyouts and Dissociationunder No-Fault, 60 U. CMi.L. REV. 67 (1993).

148. The road to divorce reform included a significant softening of this rule through equitable remedies
such as constructive trusts, but these were unreliable.
149. See Silbaugh, supranote 2, at 56.

150. One can certainly imagine a better law still, where dependent children, rather than adult affiliations,
were the significant basis for obligation. See generallyFINEMAN, supra note 115. But I take that to be much
further outside the mainstream vision for legal structuring of the family than is a vision of substantive
obligations without regard to contributions.
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does matter, I argue that present interpretations mean that courts have failed to
grasp fully the economic contribution of home labor. This is evidenced by
courts' curious treatment of women who both work in the wage labor market and
also do a substantial majority of the home labor, thus contributing to family
wealth with wages and with home labor. This mixture of contributions, as
discussed in Section I1,describes most women today. But when wage-earning
women try to invoke additional considerations for contribution to wealth
generated by home labor, courts have responded that, despite the language of the
statute, those provisions only cover the full-time homemaker.''
This judicial response indicates that courts are not recognizing the wealth
created by home labor, but instead wish to show compassion for the very real
financial straights in which a full-time homemaker can find herself after divorce.
If judges understood home labor as creating actual material wealth, home labor
would have to be counted into contribution to wealth creation in addition to the
wage contribution of a wage-earning home-making spouse. Women are working
longer combined hours than are men. While this does not necessarily mean that
they are contributing more economic value, that conclusion is possible. 152 The
proposition is at least worth exploring. By refusing to credit the home labor
contributions of the wage-earning home-making spouse, judges are ignoring the
economic value of the home labor of the majority of women. The full-time
homemaker is the exception today, not the rule, and divorce law has no provision
whatsoever for capturing the economic value generated by home labor in the
majority of cases. This results, at least in part, from a failure to bring a proper
economic understanding of that labor into legal analysis, relying instead on an
understanding of marriage roles as described by the terms "breadwinner" and
"homemaker." Despite their apparent economic base, these role designations
have a social significance from which economics is almost entirely removed.
It is important to remember that we might decide that the amount of
contribution should not be the decisive factor in determining property allocation
at the time of divorce. However, we may benefit from a clearer examination of
the proper outcomes of such policy options when informed by an economic
understanding. This exercise might help us clarify our goals in divorce law by
presenting the possible understandings of legal obligations associated with
marriage, and force us to further examine the strengths and weaknesses of
marriage as the relevant institution for financially supporting the dependencies
arising from childhood, illness and aging.

151. In m Marriage of Banach, 489 N.E.2d 363, 369 (0LApp. Ct 1986); In r Marriage of Stice, 779
P.2d 1020, 1027-28 (Or. 1989); Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 62-63.
152. Here we would want to know a lot about human capital investments and how well they are being
used. Also, the measurement tool chosen for valuation of home labor will be important in determining whether
the typical female labor profile is contributing more value. I do not intend to make that case here.
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F Caveatson the Use ofEconomics
Of course, some practical risks attend the use of economic understandings of
home labor. First, there is a concrete risk that the deflated wages of the paid
domestic worker will be used to estimate the value of unpaid work, as they are in
the wrongful death and divorce contexts. Analysts have to be cautious in
deciding which measure of the value of home labor to use. One might prefer
opportunity cost as a measure, or a measure that aggregates the price of experts,
such as nurses, teachers, launderers and cooks, in order to figure out the value of
home labor, rather than the price of generalist housecleaners in the domestic
labor market. 153 More importantly, reformers should be deeply concerned about
the low wages of paid domestic workers and place efforts at raising those wages
at the forefront of the debate over activity within the home. Finally, the use of
economic understandings may, as some fear, diminish other understandings in
practice.
The answer to these concerns is to note carefully and be constantly mindful
both of distortions in present valuation of home labor and in the alternative noneconomic understandings of the work. None of these reservations justify
foregoing the very useful insights economics brings to the public policy
questions surrounding women's home labor. We must remember the distinction
between identifying questions through economic understandings and producing
answers. Producing answers requires that all conceptions of an activity be
considered together. It also requires an extremely detailed examination of the
empirical data, with attention to the limitations of empirical knowledge that
come both from data collection methodology and from the fact that facts do not
explain their own causes and cannot be taken as static starting points, even when
they are verifiable.
V CONCLUSION

The commodification critique is often a conversation stopper. Because markets
do not capture the entire experience in question, they are thought to threaten the
existence of what they cannot describe. In the context of a phenomenon that is
highly commodified, this argument might lead to fruitful discussions of the
appropriate methods of preserving non-market understandings. In the context of
phenomenon that are almost entirely non-market, however, the objection to
commodification seems much weaker, because it fails to consider the potential
benefits that economic understandings can bring to the social relations
surrounding that non-market phenomenon. Since many of women's activities

153. See generally EUSTON QUAH, ECONOMICS AND HOME PRODUCTION: THEORY AND MEASUREMENT

(1993) (exploring various studies that have measured the value of home labor and various techniques that can
be used, along with strengths and weaknesses).
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have historically occurred outside of the market, a normative position against
market reasoning about home activities is nearly equivalent to a normative
position against market reasoning about women's activities. As long as women's
economic power remains a central concern of feminist discourse, this aversion to
market analysis is detrimental to feminist reform. Understanding the economic
aspects of women's non-market activity is an important part of the
transformative vision of a progressive feminism. Only after asking questions
about the relationship between non-market reasoning and women's economic
weakness can we decide what kinds of policy changes will benefit women both
as a class, and as divided by differences that are relevant to economic status. By
comparison, concern about a world where women's lives are stripped of all but
their monetary value seems a fairly abstract one.

